Frustrated with the "white imperialism" of the League of Nations and the "red imperialism" of the Third Communist International, a number of Chinese intellectuals began discussing possibilities for a third option during the interwar years. Turning away from liberalism and Marxism, they examined Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People and began working to promote his Principle of Nationalism as a concept that focused on the ruoxiao (weak and small nations) and could liberate people around the world that were suffering under imperialism. This discourse often centered on the possibility of creating a new form of "International," the International of Nations, which would unite the oppressed nations of the world in opposition to the imperialist nations, rather than divide nations along class lines, as Chinese critics perceived the Comintern to do. This article examines Chinese intellectual discussions of a China-centered "International" by a variety of writers, including Dai Jitao and Hu Hanmin, from 1925 to 1937. The author shows that, although this discourse on a China-centered "International of Nations" influenced intellectuals' perceptions of China's position and responsibility in the world, it was consumed and invalidated by Japanese imperialism, as the Japanese Empire employed a similar discourse of pan-Asianism to justify militarism in the 1930s and 1940s.
cultural centrality of China that wedded modern Asianism to the Sinocentric tribute system. To an indeterminable degree, this discourse was GMD propaganda initially intended to abrogate the authority of the Communist Party and its Comintern backer. The same was later used to refute the propaganda of the Asian Monroe Doctrine that was often used to justify the expansionism of the Japanese Empire. However, beyond propaganda, the new Sinocentrism of GMD leadership discourse led to a wide-ranging research program for China's frontiers, borderlands, and neighboring countries. This research program, in turn, furthered a spatially defined nationalism that raised intellectuals' consciousness of territory. 
The Limits of China and New Asia
According to Charles Maier, the twentieth century was the century of territoriality (Maier 2000) . This was certainly true in China. In her PhD dissertation on China's borders, Zhihong Chen makes use of Maier's understanding of the twentieth century to explain and contextualize Chinese intellectuals' fascination with territoriality during the Nanjing decade of [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] Smith 39
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review E-Journal No. 24 (September 2017) • (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/e-journal/issue-24) (Chen 2008) . As elusive political authority was finally consolidated with the dissolution of warlordism and the reestablishment of the Republic of China in Nanjing, and with Japan, Russia, and other powers still eager to slice off China's extremities, the question for China's thinkers became the territorial boundaries of China. This had crucial importance in defining the territory of the later People's Republic, but was also important in defining China's relationship with neighboring countries.
A concrete example of this is Xie Bin's History of China's Territorial Losses. First published in 1925, it was republished seven times by 1941 and even used as a middle school textbook in Shanghai (Xie 1926) . Xie Bin was a military officer, but also a prolific writer in the 1920s and 1930s, penning a number of books on military strategy, development, and China's frontiers, especially Yunnan, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Mongolia. Talk of China's losses was a form of nationalism based on shame and trauma. Such writings on the history of territorial losses and national shame were repeated continuously, producing a collective trauma that emotionally prepared this new generation for action against further incursions, forecasting the rise of a positive form of nationalism that would sweep the country in the 1940s.
The map that Xie published in 1925-The Lost Land and Sea Territories of China
中國喪失領土領海圖 (figure 2)-was distributed with his book and remains widely available.
The book's far-reaching impact could be seen in the pages of the journal New Asia 新亞細亞 a few years later (Chen 2008, 47) .
Disseminating this territory-based nationalism in the early 1930s, the GMD began a political movement with the long-term goals of reasserting Chinese control over lost territories in the spirit of the Chinese Revolution and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles. The desire for this was articulated in the publications produced by the New Asia Research Association, a society of university professors, intellectuals, and politicians interested in China's frontiers and neighbors.
The GMD subsidized the organization, but members also contributed through donations and membership fees (Chen 2008, 44) . Although the group was created with an academic focus, there was little distinction between scholarly and ideological purposes. Chiang Kai-shek and the Nanjing government turned to the League of Nations for help (Mitter 2000, 5) . The failure of the League to deal with the Manchurian Incident was the final straw for Chinese politicians and intellectuals who had maintained lingering hopes for its intentions. The New Asia Research Association, however, was established on the eve of this disaster by elites who were aware of the possibility of the cutting up of China and were preparing for this through efforts to assert China's authority over the frontiers. 2 This echoed Harrison's own words, as she assumed that China would pass through the present turmoil and experience a strong rebirth, and that China, Japan, and Korea could create a race-based alliance (Harrison 1928, 274) . Hua Qiyun 華企雲, one of the most prolific of New Asia's essayists, used his translator's preface to remind readers that "the Republic of China contains one half of the population of Asia. Thus, the responsibility for leading the other nations in our mutual struggle falls upon us!" (Hua 1932, unpaginated This understanding of a coming reorganization of the global system appropriated Marxist understandings of imperialism and global capitalism, yet the key concept of ruoxiao was not derived from classical Marxism.
Ruoxiao Nations: Reunderstanding the Colonial Situation
Ruoxiao is almost invariably translated in English as "weak and small." This is a fine direct translation, but it misses the more nuanced connotations of the term. Ruoxiao nations are defined in opposition to capitalist imperialist nations. And imperialism is defined in the Leninist sense of the term, as a transnational extension of financial capitalism. Imperialist nations were those in the stage of financial capitalism, and ruoxiao nations were those that remained in an agricultural and craftsman stage of development. The difference was defined temporally (Du n.d., 1-3). Further, nations that were defined as ruoxiao were usually made up of colonized and oppressed peoples of the Western and Japanese Empires. Therefore, the term ruoxiao must be understood within an international system. It was used to understand China's place between the weak and the strong. It was never used to refer to minorities within China, such as Tibetans, although it was often used to refer to minorities in other countries, such as Jews. In 1928, Li Zuohua 李作華 published a popular book that listed the ruoxiao nations and their individual circumstances. 3 The book was reissued a number of times, but soon had to compete with similar collections that were expanded, updated, and regionally focused as ruoxiao nations became a popular topic of study in the 1930s. Definitions of ruoxiao included "colonized," "semi-colonized," and Sun's idea of a "subcolony" 次殖民地-a colony of all countries, referring to China (Sun n.d., 10). These last two categories emphasized external control over the economic production or markets of the nation (Du n.d., 9-13). Ruoxiao was thus sometimes a term that was more specific than "oppressed," but more inclusive than "colonized." Unlike the latter term, it emphasized economic over political oppression. As Rebecca Karl has shown for the decades immediately preceding this period, Chinese intellectuals redefined China and the world by appropriating uneven global spaces "translated" through the colonized and oppressed nations of the world (Karl 2002, 10) . literary Chinese: ruorou-qiangshi ("The meat of the weak is eaten by the strong") (Lenin 1964, 382; Chen 1921 ). In the early twentieth century, the strong (qiang) brought to mind the colonial powers lie-qiang. Chen was referring to China, Korea, and other oppressed nations when he used the term ruoxiao.
In the early 1920s, writers and translators began to show an interest in the literary output of so-called oppressed peoples. The popular writer Mao Dun and his Short Story Monthly 小说月报 were particularly instrumental in introducing works of Polish, Jewish, black, and Irish writers (Eber 1980) . This focus soon began to include fiction from Asia, as the preferred term drifted from "oppressed" to "ruoxiao." Collections of short stories from ruoxiao nations appeared during the 1930s and introduced the fiction of a variety of oppressed and colonized peoples, including Irish, Jewish, and those from New Zealand, as well as Korean and Taiwanese (Anonymous 1936; Chen 1942 ).
The term became particularly important in 1926, when it was used in the Second National Congress of the GMD, at which members agreed to sympathize with and unite with the "weak and small" nations of the entire world (Jiang 2003, 354) . Delegates from across Southeast Asia attended the congress and began organizing to unite the Chinese in Nanyang in order to pursue emancipation (Belogurova 2014, 452) . After the congress, the term ruoxiao regularly appeared in writings by the GMD elite. Wang Jingwei clarified his own usage of the term, arguing that China was a special case among the ruoxiao, as it was not a small (xiao) nation, but a large one, and therefore might be called a ruoda nation. This was an even worse state to be in, and was due to China's concentration on spiritual, rather than material, development (Sun 1996, 732-733) .
However, it was Sun's use of the term in his Three Principles that authorized it as a crucial keyword for the late 1920s and the 1930s.
Chinese Paternalism and the Asian Elder Brother
In his speeches on nationalism, Sun used the term "ruoxiao nations" to refer to peoples oppressed by imperialism. In Sun's sixth speech on nationalism, a speech that emphasized China's duty to lead the ruoxiao nations, Sun connected the term to another classical Chinese concept, jiruofuqing, meaning to "aid and support the weak."
It was this policy, explained Sun, that allowed small countries like Vietnam, Burma, Korea, and Siam to maintain their independence before the Europeans arrived. For Chinese nationalism to succeed and for China to realize "our nation's true spirit," the Chinese nation "must support the ruoxiao nations and oppose the world powers" (Sun 1996, 732-733) . Sun integrated the assumed values of China's tributary system and a development approach for surrounding nations as his future foreign policy theory. 4 Drawing on China's glorious past as the center of the tribute system, Sun looked to a future in which China could lead Asia.
Sun Yat-sen's theory of nationalism was more complicated than strict ethnic nationalism.
He emphasized the importance of giving preference to blood relations of nation and race, which he believed to be naturally constructed through wangdao, the Confucian principle of benevolent rule, as opposed to the state, a Western construct based on violent or coercive hegemony (Sun n.d., 3). Sun's return to this principle was nothing new. Indeed, it had recurred in Japanese writings regularly after the Meiji period (Brown 2007, 135 In discussions of Asia, its future, and its past, Chinese intellectuals asserted Asia's qualification as the "elder brother," or lao dage, due to the continent's area, population, history, and culture (Xin Yaxiya editors 1930, 11-12; Harrison 1932, unpaginated introduction) . However, it was the ideology of the Three Principles that put China in an advanced position from which its leaders could tutor and support the surrounding nations. In a rather extreme religious analogy, Du Jiu 杜久 argued that Sun Yat-sen's "nationalism" was a "bible" for uniting the ruoxiao nations: "We must now endeavor to spread the word of this bible to all of the ruoxiao nations and bring them to believe that only once we are all united can we hope to overthrow imperialism" (Du n.d., 25) . This missionary work of the GMD was a means by which the meek could find salvation and be liberated from their mutual oppressors:
The modern national revolution is a movement against imperialism. All ruoxiao nations must unite in a front for the anti-imperialist movement because we are in the same position, that of the oppressed. We have the same enemy, imperialism. Our objectives are the same; we want freedom and equality. Our hopes are the same, mutual aid. Our methods are the same: the overthrow of imperialism. The power we need is the same: the power to oppose imperialism. And the high principles on which we rely are the same: the realization of worldwide utopia [datong] . (Du n.d., 23)
For pro-GMD writers in the Nanjing decade, China and the GMD were poised to lift the world toward datong due to their centrality. As New Asia Research Group member Zhang Zhenzhi explained, "Asian culture can be said to be the center of world culture, and Chinese culture can be said to be the center of Asian culture" (Zhang 1930a, 83) . Zhang further clarified his argument that Chinese culture, the root of "world culture," came from the high plateaus of what is now the far west of Xinjiang two issues later in "The Southward Development of Chinese Culture." In this article, he also conflated the Chinese nation with the Han ethnicity, saying "The Chinese people, who are the Han people" (Zhang 1930a, 65) . This conflation was not acceptable in a 1930 GMD publication, and other scholars rose to challenge Zhang. Chen
Yaobin 陳耀斌 wrote in to New Asia to argue that all the nations of China are actually part of the Chinese nation, so there is no need for any of them to claim independence. Zhang responded to the letter, explaining that his article was about the historical Chinese nation, which did not include minorities, while the current Chinese nation certainly did include all nationalities (Chen 1931 This matter points to the difficulties and ambiguities of Chinese Asianism and Chinese leadership, particularly in contrast with Japanese Asianism, which also ostensibly stipulated that all nations must achieve independence and equality, including Tibetans, Mongolians, and Manchus, despite many Japanese writers' belief in Japanese superiority. Of course, any emphasis on Chinese or Japanese centrality was irreconcilable with the other. And although most Asianist writing from both countries maintained the argument that Asianism was about peace and equality, any plans for institutionalized Asianism inevitably slipped toward centralization. For some Chinese writers, this institution was the organization of the ruoxiao nations, the International of Nations 民族國際.
In a book titled How to Unite the Ruoxiao Nations, editor Du Jiu called for the unification of these nations under the GMD. 5 His understanding of leadership was the tutelage of equal nations:
China's Guomindang is the world's kindest, strongest, and earliest established revolutionary organization to seek equality among nations. We hope that every ruoxiao nation can have this sort of organization as it is necessary to have a strong revolutionary organization in order to lead the revolutionary movement. (Du n.d., 33)
Sun Yat-sen himself was never recorded specifically describing an international institution by which China and the GMD could lead the ruoxiao nations. However, he did make general calls for them to be united: "We must first unite ourselves, then through sympathy for others in the same state, unite the ruoxiao nations and fight the 250,000,000 [imperialists] together, using right to defeat might" (Sun 1924, quoted in Du n.d., 25) . Based on these words, Sun's followers envisioned a global structure led by the GMD, a new form of the Communist
International known as the International of Nations.
On the International of Nations
Shortly found throughout promotion of the organization, and some intellectuals linked the movement to Woodrow Wilson's famous Fourteen Points. 6 Du Jiu explained:
The fundamental program of the operation is none other than political and economic alliance [tongmeng] . Political alliance refers to political integration in order to gather the strength of all the individual ruoxiao nations in order to resist the political invasion of the imperialists and to resolve the political issues of each ruoxiao nation. Just as the League of Nations is actually a political alliance to unite white imperialism against ruoxiao nations, the Third International is a political alliance of red imperialism. ( Sun was really a traditionalist who had based his writings on Confucianism, the belief structure at the heart of China and soon to be at the heart of the International of Nations. As someone who had once devoted himself to the study of Marxist thought, Dai was a particularly dangerous problem for Communist intellectuals due to his ability to employ the language of his enemies as well as they could (Lu 2004, 145-148 to China, even went as far as calling Dai one of the "five evils" in China, the others being imperialism, warlords, comprador capitalists, and GMD rightists (Lu 2004, 150) International, Tan argued that the Third International was destined to fail because it concentrated only on the proletariat and "cannot represent the interests of the entirety of the ruoxiao nations" (Tan 1929, 1, 6-7, 8) . As the Soviets had refused to support the GMD, Tan reasoned that they would never support all of China and would divide its strength:
We must organize the International of Nations, unite with the oppressed peoples or the proletariat of the West, offering them a firm and powerful force to struggle against the capitalist class. Then the capitalist class of the imperialist states will have no power left to oppress us. We must organize the International of Nations, unite the ruoxiao nations of the East, including India, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Burma, shake off the imperialists, and gain independence. Then the imperialists will have no time for colonizing and have no power left to oppress us. (Tan 1929, 8-9) Drawing on Sun's sixth speech on "Nationalism," Tan connected the International to the countries of the former tribute system. Tan also extended Dai's argument for the International of Nations to allow for the inclusion of Western proletariat forces, just as Sun had argued that China should support the oppressed classes of imperialist nations (Tan 1929, 8-11) . This was a logical and expected answer to Communist critiques. However, other theoretical approaches to the International provided even more obvious Marxist analysis.
The people [of the ruoxiao nations] are the commodities of imperialism, and the supplier of imperialism's industrial material at the same time. Their countries are sites for imperialists' surplus capital, and also the sphere of imperial rule. In short, the imperialists are the masters and they are the slaves. So the common masses of the oppressed nations, especially the worker and peasant masses, have a life of hardship beyond expression in words. (Jingpu 1928, 24) In the above passage, Jingpu 荊璞 relates the subalternesque situation of the proletariat within the ruoxiao nations, showing the glaring difference between the workers or peasants of oppressed Asian nations and the workers or peasants of imperialist Western states.
From this we can also see that the International of Nations was a discursive strategy to deny Comintern leadership in the global revolution, calling into question its legitimacy as a global leader by debating the nature of a revolution that was limited to the proletariat. This was an important task for a revolutionary party whose own legitimacy was questioned by the Chinese Communist Party, which was now the sole Chinese party authorized by the Comintern and was therefore authorized as a legitimate part of the world revolutionary movement.
Responsibility for leadership for the global revolution, argued Jingpu, "has already passed from the proletariat to the ruoxiao nations" (1928, 23) . Although the proletariat were leaders during the industrial revolution and before the consolidation of imperialist power, Jingpu saw the ruoxiao as the central revolutionary force in the 1920s because imperialist nations now oppressed all classes in ruoxiao nations.
On these grounds, Jingpu argued that the Fifth Plenary Session of the Second Congress of the GMD, which was about to be held in August 1928, should make it a priority to establish a committee for the International of Ruoxiao Nations and invite representatives from various countries to hold a provisional session (1928, 27) . The Fifth Plenary Session did not establish the committee, but it was a crucial session in Chinese history, as Chiang Kai-shek was able to make changes to the constitution ensuring that the president remained commander-in-chief of the military and was no longer responsible to the National Government Council, but only to the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, which was himself (Zhao 1996, 75-76 The Guomindang Leading the Ruoxiao Nations Of course it must be China's Guomindang that is the leader and China's Guomindang that is the nucleus [of the International of Nations].
-Tan Pimou (1929, 10) In He did, however, make calls for the unification of the oppressed and the weak a number of times, particularly in his speech "The Solution of the Guomindang" (國民黨真解), in which he clearly explains the GMD policy of leading the ruoxiao in relation to Sun's Three Principles:
As for nationalism, Dr. Sun explained that no matter what nation or country people come from, those who are oppressed or wronged must unite together against power.… Aside from Japan, all of the ruoxiao of Asia have been brutally suppressed and suffered all manner of hardships. Sympathizing with each other's suffering, they must unite together and oppose those brutal countries. Once these oppressed nations unite, they will certainly devote themselves to war with the brutal countries. The international war of the future will not be interracial but intraracial. The white race will divide and go to war. The yellow race will divide and go to war. It will be a class war, a war between the oppressed and the oppressors.… In calling for nationalism, we will first unite ourselves, then through compassion for others' situations, we will unite all of the ruoxiao nations to defeat the 250,000,000 oppressors. (Hu 1926, 26-27) Smith 52 (Hu 1930, 18 ).
Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review
In the early 1930s, following Hu's lead, other intellectuals took up the call for this International as the only structural alliance that could defend against both white and red imperialism. In response to the white imperialists' organization into the League of Nations and the red imperialists' organization into the Third International, Yin Weilian 印維廉 argued that "the first step shall be the uniting of Asia's oppressed nationalities, the establishment of the International of Nations. Only with such a specific international organization can we establish common purpose and common action" (Yin 1930, 97) . Explaining why only the Republic of China could lead Asia, Yin wrote:
Firstly, only the Chinese nation has such a population large enough to fight against the white race. Secondly, the Chinese nation has a completely superior national character [minzu xing] in terms of its national moral structure [minzu daode], national ideology [minzusixiang] , and national ability [minzu nengli]. Thirdly, under the leadership of the Three Principles of the People, the Chinese nation will never succumb to riding the coattails of imperialism and use force to persecute other nations. (Yin 1930, 97) New Asia continued to be used as a vehicle to promote the idea of Chinese leadership and the International of Nations. In 1932, Hong Weifa 洪為法, a member of Guo Moruo's Creation Society, published a more detailed article on the need for the organization. Not unlike Hu Hanmin, he argued that there were three trends for power in the contemporary international struggle: imperialism, represented by the League of Nations; socialism, represented by the Third International; and nationalism, particularly the nationalism of the ruoxiaominzu, which needed an international organization to represent these nations and further their interests (Hong 1932, 31) . Although he did not use the term "red imperialism," he was critical of the "class struggle" for its role in "substantially detracting from the movement for the independence of the ruoxiao nations" (1932, 34) . But again, the reasons Hong employed to argue for Chinese leadership 
Cultural Superiority
Beginning in the nineteenth century and accelerating during the New Culture Movement of the 1910s, a debate on the merits of Eastern versus Western cultures imagined the two in the form of a dichotomy (Fung 2010, 31-37) . By the 1930s, partly in concert with the rise of Chinese nationalism, a belief in the moral or spiritual superiority of a Sinocentric Asian culture was commonplace. This is reflected in the reasoning behind arguments for Chinese leadership of the International of Nations:
In the current phase, the ruoxiao nations are unorganized. The ruoxiao nation that will take the position of leader must have a glorious history, a solid foundation, and a noble culture. Of course, only the Chinese nation can fill these requirements and take on the responsibility of leadership. Chinese readers continued to show interest in Japanese Asianism and had opportunities to follow Japanese debates on Asianism through occasional translations, most were well aware that the Japanese government was at odds with the more egalitarian of the Asianists. It was therefore important to show difference with Japan's aggressive policies.
Differentiating Chinese Asianism from Japanese Monroism
Like most Chinese intellectuals, Dai Jitao had abandoned his pro-Japanese Asianism by 1931. His concerns about militarism had begun with a 1927 visit to Japan and only accelerated over the following years (Lu 2004, 164) . Any talk of an Asian union ignored Japan during these years and concentrated on the ruoxiao nations. Although Dai Jitao turned more to his interests in education and the study of the Northwest after 1930, the momentum for an International of Nations continued to influence intellectuals, but differentiating China from Japan became a paramount issue.
The idea of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia was a recurring theme in Japanese writing (Hotta 2007, 95-97) Asianism, came into dominance (2007, 49) . Chinese intellectuals had regularly refuted these claims to Japanese leadership from the early days of the Republic.
Therefore, in the post-Sun period, differentiating Chinese Asianism from the Monroism that was gaining momentum in Japan was crucial for those Chinese intellectuals who continued to use the term "Asianism" in the 1930s, especially after Manchukuo became nominally independent. This problem with the term was debated early on in New Asia in an article by Ma Hetian.
Ma was a researcher of the frontiers and also a longtime proponent of Asianism, having been a key member of Beijing's Asian Nations' Alliance 亞細亞民族大同盟in the 1920s and a representative at the Asia Peoples' Conferences in Nagasaki (1926) and Shanghai (1927) . He described New Asia thus: "The purpose of the publication of New Asia is what the president often called 'Great Asianism.' This New Asianism is the real Great Asianism, not the Great Asianism promoted by imperialists or those that admire imperialism" (Ma 1930, 139) . Ma noted that the Chinese statist Zeng Qi曾琦 had used the term Great Asianism to call for a more aggressive China that would make Korea, Annan, Siam, and Burma into "Chinese territory" (中 國屬地). Ma clarified that the Asianism of New Asia was one that followed "benevolence and morality" (仁義道德) and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles (Ma 1930) .
Only a month later, Ke Xing'e 克興額 offered an analysis of Great Asianism that echoed Li Dazhao's "New Asianism" of 1919, which saw Asianism as a necessary step toward a world government. Ke also turned to Sun Yat-sen's speeches to prove that Asianism was not Monroism.
First we must unite together and unanimously oppose Euro-American powerful nations, as well as this continent's imperious nation-Japan. Then the ruoxiao nations from other continents will naturally arise and oppose them, and the liberation of all ruoxiao nations and the collapse of imperialism that we have been anticipating will be successful. In this way, the party's support of nationalism for ruoxiao nations around the world can accelerate and find success, and we shall be able to stride from this into the successful attainment of cosmopolitanism. (Ke 1930) Ke was writing this not only for New Asia. A few years later, early in the war, Ke wrote to the GMD in Chongqing, exhorting China's leaders to end the war and pursue peace for China and for all of East Asia. Peace for him did not just mean an end to the war: "We must unite all of the Chen Liefu 陳烈甫, a Chinese-Filipino scholar of Hui (Islamic) Studies, who had been able to study in the United States due to his Filipino citizenship, wrote a detailed article on the Monroe Doctrine for New Asia. Perhaps his education at the University of Illinois had contributed to his more positive stance on the concept. His opposition to Japanese leadership was unapologetic, but he concluded his article: "Only when Japanese imperialism has been overthrown can there be a true Asian Monroe Doctrine. This great mission and sacred duty is upon the shoulders of the Chinese nation" (Chen 1933, 32) .
Conclusion
The propaganda concerning the Chinese leadership of the ruoxiao nations and the International of Nations was designed largely to counter the aspirations of both Communist groups and the Japanese Empire. Chinese intellectuals involved in this project believed in China's inevitable return to dominance. They had hoped that this rise would be benevolent, often basing this hope on their acceptance of a dichotomy that posited China as Confucian and righteous at essence, a dichotomy that was all too logical given the aggression of Western imperialism. And they wholeheartedly leapt into the global zeitgeist of internationalism.
With the postwar rise of the League of Nations and the Comintern, there was evidence all around that international unity was the future. And with talk of pan-Arabism, pan-Africanism, pan-Slavism, and pan-Germanism, regionalism was a powerful global trend. This led to an opportunity for the imagining of a China-centered international community, the International of Nations, an ersatz form of the Third Communist International.
Although the International of Nations and 1930s discussions of Chinese Asianism were usually intended to oppose Japanese expansionism, the discourse was not unlike Japanese propaganda and fed into wartime promotion of the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Once Wang Jingwei became president of the Nanjing-based Reorganized Nationalist Government in 1940, Asianist propaganda almost identical to that found in the above texts became commonplace, as newspapers and periodicals repeated Wang's argument that, "for China, the Three Principles of the People is an ideology to save the country.
For East Asia, the Three Principles of the People is Great Asianism" (Wang 1984, 211 See Li (1928 ), Hu (1929 ), Zheng (1936 ), and Zhang (1937 .
